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Abstract
The term structure of interest rates does not adhere to the expectations hy-
pothesis, possibly due to a risk premium. We consider the implications of a risk
premium that arises from endogenous market segmentation driven by variable
inflation rates. In the absence of autocorrelation in inflation, the risk premium
is constant. If inflation is correlated, however, the risk premium becomes time
varying and we can rationalize the failure of the expectations hypothesis. In-
direct empirical tests of the model’s implications are provided.
JEL Classification: E43, G12
Keywords: Expectations hypothesis; Term structure; Time-Varying Risk Premia;
Segmented markets; Inflation
1 Introduction
The expectations hypothesis (EH) of the yield curve of interest rates holds that the
n-period yield is a weighted average of the m period yield, m < n, and the expected
(n−m)-period yield. Empirical work has consistently rejected this linear relationship. The
failure of the EH in term structure of the yield curve was first observed by Fama and Bliss
(1987). Many other papers have subsequently documented the same result of Famma, see
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e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1991), Hardouvelis (1994), Gerlach and Smets (1997), Bekaert
and Hodrick (2001) to name a few.
Currently, the main explanation for the rejection of EH in the term structure is the
existence of time varying risk premia.1 Due to the rather small variations in aggregate
consumption, a representative agent model with a standard utility function cannot gener-
ate large and variable risk premia. For this reason, the explanations based on such frame-
work, including the work of Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989), Donaldson, Johnsen, and
Mehra (1990), den Haan (1995) and Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997), encounter dif-
ficulties. The time varying risk premia have been explained by means of habit formation
in preference functions, see e.g. Brandt and Wang (2003), Wachter (2006), or by means of
the Epstein-Zin recursive recursive utility function, as in Bansal and Shaliastovich (2007),
and Rudebusch and Swanson (2012). A different avenue has been followed by Buraschi
and Jiltsov (2005), who rely on a tax wedge.
There is a smaller but growing literature that explains time varying risk premia from
endogenous market segmentation. Limited participation implies that a subset of the pop-
ulation is responsible for the adjustments in financial markets. This generates larger risk
premia than representative agent models in which everyone participates in (complete) fi-
nancial markets. In addition to the exogenous assumption that there are different types of
households, there are two effective ways to generate endogenous segmentation between
households.
One assumption is that financial markets are complete coupled with limited enforce-
ment of financial contracts.2 Seppala (2004) compares the real term structure under the no
friction Lucas economy (see Lucas (1978)) and the limited risk-sharing Alvarez-Jermann
economy (Alvarez and Jermann (2001)). Seppala shows that “only the model with limited
risk-sharing can generate enough variation in the term premia to account for the rejections
of expectations hypothesis” (Seppala (2004), p1510).
The second avenue is the segmented market approach. An endogenous market seg-
mentation model was developed by Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002) and (2009). In Al-
1Several other explanations have been offered. For example, Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (2001) refer to
the peso problem. Bansal and Zhou (2002) use a regime shifting model, while Sinha (2009) considers learning
behavior.
2The idea of limited contract enforceability was first used by Kehoe and Levine (1993) for investigating the
behavior of asset markets. Later it was used by Alvarez and Jermann (2001) for examining the implications of
asset pricing and by Kehoe and Perri (2002) for exploring the implications of the international business cycle.
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varez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009), the endogenously segmented market model generates
sufficient large variation of the time-varying risk premia to resolve the forward premium
puzzle of exchange rates.
Inspired by the model of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009), we address the expec-
tations puzzle with an endogenously segmented market model. We solve the model with
correlated inflation and show that this is necessary for rejection of the EH. The intuition
is as follows. In the absence of autocorrelation in inflation, the risk premium is constant.
This is unimportant in the two period model of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009). But
to explain the the yield curve, one needs a multiperiod model in which pricing kernels are
correlated. If inflation is correlated, however, the risk premium becomes time varying and
we can rationalize the failure of the expectations hypothesis. We also provide a test for the
model by relating the size of the bias to the amount of autocorrelation and the level of the
variance of the money supply shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical
tests for the EH in term structure. Section 3 gives a concise description of the model.
Section 4 provides the theoretical proof that the consumption-based model can reslove the
expectations puzzle. Section 5 offers numerical backing. Section 6 presents the empirical
evidence for our results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence Review
Using postwar U.S. bond yields, Campbell and Shiller (1991) show the values of β in
regressions like
yt+m,n−m − yt,n = const+ βn,m m
n−m(yt,n − yt,m) + error
are negative and increase in absolute value with maturity n for almost any combination
of maturities between one month and ten years. The EH holds that β = 1. This evidence
constitutes the expectations puzzle of the term structure, first documented by Fama and
Bliss (1987) and Campbell and Shiller (1991).3 In addition to nominal yields, the real yields
also reject the EH, see Bansal and Shaliastovich (2007) and Sinha (2009).
3A related rejection of the EH exists in the foreign exchange markets. This was first documented by Fama
(1984) and is usually referred to as the forward premium puzzle.
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Backus, Foresi, Mozumdar, and Wu (2001) and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005) use U.S.
data and obtain results similar to Campbell and Shiller (1991). Empirical tests conduct-
ed on interest rates outside the US, however, often show that the EH cannot be rejected
at multiple horizons.4 More importantly, empirical results show that yields of long-term
maturities are more likely to violate the EH than yields of short-term maturities. Hardou-
velis (1994) tests the long-term (10-year) and short-term (three-month) bond yields in G7
countries. When the long-term yields are used, five out the seven countries give nega-
tive β. However, for the short-term yields, all countries have a positive β, though all of
these are lower than 1. Gerlach and Smets (1997) test the EH with 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-month
Euro-rates. Their results show that the EH cannot be rejected for 35 cases out of the total
51 cases. Longstaff (2000) tested the expectations hypothesis at the extreme short end of
the term structure using overnight, weekly, and monthly repo rates. His results show the
expectations hypothesis cannot be rejected at any maturity level.
Table 1 shows the results of our test using Euro-rates for the currencies of 17 countries.
Our results also show that the negative βn,m is not universal. The empirical values of β
are either smaller or larger than unity. For example, all the values of βn,m for French franc
rates are larger than unity and increase in n. So the expectations hypothesis is rejected
in two directions and one would also like to be able to account for this. Moreover, the
decreasing trend of β in n is observed in only a few countries, such as Australia and the
U.S. While for most countries, this trend is absent.
3 The Model with Segmented Markets
The baseline model that we use is the same with that of Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe
(2009). This section provides a concise description of the model.
In the economy there is an asset market and a goods market. Households can buy
and sell government bonds in the asset market. The Government injects money in the
asset market by paying the maturing bonds. This determines the money growth rate µt.
In each period, the shock to money growth is the only source of uncertainty in this econ-
omy. At the end of each period, each household receives the same real endowment y.
4For the empirical test of EH for other countries, see Hardouvelis (1994), Evans and Lewis (1994) Gerlach
and Smets (1997), Longstaff (2000), Dominguez and Novales (2000), Bekaert and Hodrick (2001), and Jongen,
Verschoor, and Wolff (2011) et al.
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Households sell their endowment at the current price level Pt to obtain money Pty and
transfer money to the next period for consumption in the goods market or for buying
bonds in the asset market. Money can be transferred between the goods market and the
asset market. Households who transfer money between the two markets have to pay a
real transfer cost γ. Besides the traditional interpretation for such a cost as the brokerage
fee, the bid-ask spread and the transaction tax, the literature explores more motives for
this cost. Chatterjee and Corbae (1992) view the transfer cost as a cost involved in writing
enforceable private debt contracts. Reis (2006) and Alvarez, Guiso, and Lippi (2012) con-
sider the costs of acquiring, absorbing and processing information. Gust and Lopez-Salido
(2014) interpret the presence of the transfer cost as reflecting time spent on the activities
of re-optimizing and responding to new information, and the human inertia of sticking
to a predetermined plan. Thus one can consider the transfer cost as the aggregate effect
of all kinds of frictions which can be tangible or intangible. The value of γ varies across
households with a distribution F (γ) and density f(γ).
There is no storage technology available in the economy except for money, so the en-
dowment y of each period has to be consumed within the same period. The consumption
of households is subject to the cash-in-advance constraint and the transition law. In period
t, given state st,
c(st, γ) =
P (st−1)y
P (st)
+ x(st, γ)z(st, γ) (3.1)
The resource constraint is given by
∫ [
c(st, γ) + γz(st, γ)
]
f(γ)dγ = y (3.2)
where c(st, γ) is the consumption of a household in period t and x(st, γ) is the real balance
that the household chooses to transfer between the two markets. If the value of x(st, γ) is
positive, it means that money is transferred from the asset market into the goods market,
and vice versa. The indicator variable z(st, γ) is equal to 0 if x(st, γ) is 0, otherwise, it is
equal to 1.
It is assumed that households hold their assets in interest-bearing bonds rather than
cash. This assumption is intuitive because bonds have tended to dominate the zero return
on cash as long as nominal interest rates are positive. With this assumption, we have that
the inflation rate pit is equal to the money growth rate µt, i.e. pit = µt = PtPt−1 . So (3.1) can
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be written as
c(st, γ) =
y
µt
+ x(st, γ)z(st, γ) (3.3)
Households are divided into two types, labeled as the active and inactive households, de-
pending on whether they transfer assets between goods and financial markets or not. We
denote cA(st, γ) as the consumption of an active household for a given st. The consump-
tion of both kinds of households adds up to
c(st, γ) = z(st, γ)cA(s
t, γ) + [1− z(st, γ)]y/µt, with
 z(s
t, γ) = 0, if x(st, γ) = 0
z(st, γ) = 1, if x(st, γ) 6= 0
(3.4)
The expression (3.4) shows the consumption for the financially inactive households is
pinned down by their real money balances y/µt as z(st, γ) = 0.
Inflation reduces the consumption of the inactive households from y to y/µt. The
higher the inflation is, the lower the consumption of the inactive households will be. This
effect of inflation causes some households to choose to pay the transfer cost and transfer
some assets from the asset market into the goods market, so that they can compensate their
loss of consumption due to inflation. If transfers are costless, all households would choose
to transfer. The difference in transfer cost leads to the segmentation between households.
The cost reduces the total amount of resources available for consumption. The combina-
tion of inflation and the transfer cost forms the only distortion in the model.
With this feature and the assumption of a complete financial market, the competitive
equilibrium allocations and asset prices can be found from the solution of the planner’s
problem. Recall there is no storage technology, so the social planner’s problem reduces to
a sequence of static optimization problems as
max
∫
U(c(st, γ))f(γ)dγ (3.5)
subject to the constraints (3.2) and (3.4). From (3.5), we get that the planning weight for
households of type γ is just the fraction of households of this type. The requirement for
this simple configuration is that all the households have equal Lagrange multipliers on
their period zero budget constraints.
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When z(st) is fixed at 1, the first-order condition for cA reduces to
U ′(cA(st, γ)) = λ(st) (3.6)
where λ(st) is the multiplier on the resource constraint, which is identical for all house-
holds. This result implies that all active households choose the same consumption level
cA(s
t, γ) independent of γ. The reason that cA is independent of γ is that the transfer cost
γ is charged in a lump sum way. This does not have a distorting effect on the consump-
tion of active households. After paying their cost, active households are identical. Thus,
all active households choose the same consumption level. The result that cA(st, γ) is in-
dependent of γ combined with the static nature of the problem tells us that cA(st) only
depends on the current money growth rate µt, so that cA(st) can be denoted as cA(µt).
The planner’s problem thus reduces to choosing cA(µ) and to determining the frac-
tions of active and inactive households to maximize the social welfare. Denote γ¯(µ) as
the threshold at a given money growth rate, which separates the two types of households.
The households with γ ≤ γ¯(µ) pay their cost and consume cA(µ). Otherwise, the house-
holds choose to be inactive with the consumption level of y/µ. For a given µ, the planner’s
problem is thus reduced to choosing cA(µ) and γ¯(µ) to solve
maxU(cA(µ))F (γ¯(µ)) + U(y/µ)[1− F (γ¯(µ))] (3.7)
subject to
cA(µ)F (γ¯(µ)) +
∫ γ¯(µ)
0
γf(γ)dγ +
y
µ
[1− F (γ¯(µ))] = y (3.8)
The first-order condition for optimal consumption and the transaction distortion reads5
U(cA(µ))− U(y/µ) + U ′(cA(µ)) [(y/µ)− γ¯(µ)− cA(µ)] = 0 (3.9)
The social planner’s problem is consistent with the functioning of the decentralized
economy. In this setup, the asset prices are given by the multipliers on the resource con-
straints for the planner’s problem. From (3.6) these multipliers are equal to the marginal
5See Appendix A for the derivation of (3.9).
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utility of active households. Hence, the pricing kernel for nominal bonds is
m(st, st+1) = δ
U ′ (cA(µt+1))
U ′ (cA(µt))
1
µt+1
, (3.10)
and for real discounted bonds it is
m∗(st, st+1) = δ
U ′ (cA(µt+1))
U ′ (cA(µt))
(3.11)
Define φ(µ) as the elasticity of the marginal utility of active households to a change in the
money growth rate µ. Thus,
φ(µ) ≡ −d logU
′ (cA(µ))
d logµ
(3.12)
Define η(µ) as the negative derivative of this elasticity to the log of inflation, thus
η(µ) ≡ d
2 logU ′ (cA(µ))
(d logµ)2
(3.13)
The equilibrium features of the model are captured in two Theorems. 6
Theorem 1. As µ increase, more households become active. In particular, γ¯′(µ) > 0 for
µ > 1 and γ¯′(1) = 0. (Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009), Proposition 2, p. 863)
Theorem 2. The log of the consumption of active households cA(µ) is strictly increasing
and strictly concave in logµ around µ = 1. In particular, φ(1) > 0 and φ′(1) < 0. (Alvarez,
Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009), Proposition 3, p. 863)
Theorem 1 says that if inflation is positive, the fraction of active households is propor-
tional to the rate of inflation. Theorem 2 implies that if inflation is low, both the elasticity
φ and its derivative η have positive values.
4 Segmented Markets and The Expectations Puzzle
This section offers a theoretical explanation for the expectations puzzle within the
realm of segmented markets. The benchmark expectations hypothesis of the term struc-
ture of interest rates holds that “the n-period interest rate equals an average of the current
6The proofs are in Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009).
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short-term rate and the future short-term rates expected to hold over the n-period hori-
zon” (Walsh (2010), p. 465). According to Campbell and Shiller (1991), the relationship
between a longer-term n-period interest rate R(n)t and a shorter-term m-period interest
rate R(m)t can be summarized as:
R
(n)
t = (1/k)
k−1∑
i=0
EtR
(m)
t+mi + c, k = n/m (4.1)
According to this theory, the yield curve of any bond or deposit satisfies7
yt,n =
m
n
yt,m +
n−m
n
Etyt+m,n−m + c, n ≥ m (4.2)
where yi,j indicates the yield (or interest rate) of a j period bond (or deposit) starting at
period i.
This implies that the slope coefficient βn,m in bond yield or deposit interest rate re-
gressions
yt+m,n−m − yt,n = const+ βn,m m
n−m(yt,n − yt,m) + error (4.3)
equals 1 at all maturities n and time steps m. This follows since with const = 0,
βn,m(OLS) =1 +
Cov[yn − ym, (n−m)ym,n−m − nyn +mym]
mV ar(yn − ym)
=1 +
Cov(yn − ym, 0)
mV ar(yn − ym) (4.4)
However, if the time-varying risk premia are included in the interest rates, the story
changes. Consider a n-period investment in a discount bond with price Pt,n. Investors
may choose to buy a n-period bond with a log return of log(1/Pt,n). Alternatively, they
can buy a m-period (m < n) bond first and after m periods, roll over and buy a (n −m)-
period bond with the proceeds from the m-period bond. The log return of the second
strategy is log[1/(Pt,m · Pt+m,n−m)]. Here Pi,j is the price of a j period bond starting at
period i.
The excess log return from a m-period bond at time t plus a (n −m)-period bond at
t + m is the premium required by the investors for bearing the risk of the open position,
because the return on the (n−m)-period bond at t+m is unknown at time t. The expected
7If the n-period yield is the average of the expected 1-period yields yn = E[y1,1 + · · · + yn,1]/n, then
nyn = mym + (n−m)ym,n−m and where ym,n−m is the n−m is the n−m period yield starting at time m.
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excess return is
Etrxt+m,n−m = pt =Et log
1
Pt,m · Pt+m,n−m − log
1
Pt,n
= log
1
Pt,m
+ Et log
1
Pt+m,n−m
− log 1
Pt,n
=myt,m + (n−m)Etyt+m,n−m − nyt,n (4.5)
and where pt is the risk premium at time t.
Upon rewriting (4.5), we get
Etyt+m,n−m − yt,n = m
n−m(yt,n − yt,m) +
pt
n−m (4.6)
Given n and m, we can see from (4.6) that if the risk premium pt is not a constant and
correlates with yt,n − yt,m, then the slope coefficient βn,m in bond regressions (4.3) will
differ from unity. The direction of the rejection of EH depends on the correlation between
yt,n − yt,m and pt.
With rational expectations, the population value for the slope coefficient of regression
(4.3) is given by8
βn,m = 1 +
Cov(Etrxt+m,n−m, yt,n − yt,m)
mV ar(yt,n − yt,m) (4.7)
The segmented market model in Section 3 implies a risk premium partly driven by infla-
tion. Moreover, the yields yt,n and yt,m are also determined by inflation, since the pricing
kernel is a function of inflation. This implies that the covariance in (4.7) is non-zero under
the segmented market model. So this model is a promising avenue to explore for solving
the expectations puzzle.
Based on the assumption that investors act optimally, the price of nominal bonds is
given by the pricing kernel defined in (3.10). This gives
Pt,n = e
−nyt,n = δnEt
U ′(cA(µt+n))
U ′(cA(µt))
1
pit,t+n
,
Pt,m = e
−myt,m = δmEt
U ′(cA(µt+m))
U ′(cA(µt))
1
pit,t+m
8See Appendix B.1 for the derivation of (4.7).
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and
Pt+m,n−m = e−(n−m)yt+m,n−m = δn−mEt+m
U ′(cA(µt+n))
U ′(cA(µt+m))
1
pit+m,t+n
,
In these price expressions pit,t+n =
∏n
i=1 µt+i is the aggregate inflation over n periods
starting from time “t”. The definition of pit,t+m and pit+m,t+n is similar to pit,t+n. Hence
nyt,n = −n log δ − logEt
[
U ′(cA(µt+n))
U ′(cA(µt))
1
pit,t+n
]
(4.8)
and
myt,m = −m log δ − logEt
[
U ′(cA(µt+m))
U ′(cA(µt))
1
pit,t+m
]
It follows that
(n−m)yt+m,n−m
=− (n−m) log δ − logEt+m
[
U ′(cA(µt+n))
U ′(cA(µt+m))
1
pit+m,t+n
]
=− (n−m) log δ − logEt+mexp
[
logU ′(cA(µt+n))− logU ′(cA(µt+m))− log pit+m,t+n
]
A quadratic Taylor approximation to the marginal utility of active households gives
logU ′ (cA(µt)) = logU ′ (cA(µ¯))− φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t (4.9)
where µˆt = logµt − log µ¯ is the deviation of the log of money growth from its central
value µ¯. Use the quadratic approximation in equation (4.9) to simplify the n-period yield
in equation (4.8)
nyt,n =− logEtexp
[
n(log δ − log µ¯)− φ(µˆt+n − µˆt)−
n∑
i=1
µˆt+i +
1
2
η(µˆ2t+n − µˆ2t )
]
, (4.10)
Note that we use that the n-period inflation is equal to the sum of the one period inflation
rates: log pit,t+n =
∑n
i=1 µˆt+i.
In order to solve for the values of nyt,n, myt,m and Etrxt+m,n−m, we need to calibrate
the values of δ, µ¯, φ and η. More importantly, we have to assume a specific monetary policy
rule that drives the process of one period inflation rates µˆt. Different monetary policy rules
lead to different rates of inflation. We now show how different inflation process µˆt affect
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the yields and the risk premium. We first consider the case that the µˆt are i.i.d. N(0, σ2)
random variables. Given that inflation rates are well known not to be independent but
positively correlated, we subsequently investigate the cases of an MA and AR process.
We show that the i.i.d. case for inflation cannot explain the expectations puzzle. But once
we turn to the more plausible MA and AR processes for inflation, the dependence induces
a risk premium such that β < 1.9
This is the point where our analysis starts to differ from the analysis in Alvarez, Atke-
son, and Kehoe (2009), or rather where we extend their model to the case of stochastic pro-
cesses. Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009) do not have to consider the stochastic process
implication. For their purpose, an assumption regarding the distribution of the innovation
suffices, since they do not have to calculate a correlation over multiple periods.
4.1 The i.i.d-Assumption for µˆt+i
First consider the case in which innovations are independently and identically nor-
mally distributed. Thus assume that
µˆt+i =εt+i, with εt+i ∼ N(0, σ2) (4.11)
Rewriting (4.10) gives
nyt,n = Θ− logEt exp
[η
2
µˆ2t − (1 + φ)µˆt
]
, (4.12)
where Θ = log µ¯− log δ + n−12 σ2.
To determine the expectation in equation (4.12), note that this is of the form
Π =
∫ +∞
−∞
eax+bx
2 1
σ
√
2pi
e−
1
2
x2
σ2 dx (4.13)
To solve this integral, write the power as follows
ax+ bx2 − 1
2
x2
σ2
= −c(x−m)2, (4.14)
where c = (1/2σ2) − b and m = a/2c. From the expectation of a non-standard normal
9In the text, we only show the main lines of reasoning. The details of derivations are in Appendix B.
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random variable, we find
Π =
1√
1− 2bσ2 exp
(
a2σ2
2− 4bσ2
)
(4.15)
so that
nyt,n = Θ +
1
2
log(1− ησ2)− (φ+ 1)
2σ2
2(1− ησ2) − φµˆt +
η
2
µˆ2t (4.16)
provided that 1− ησ2 > 0. Note that the only stochastic part in nyt,n is −φµˆt + η2 µˆ2t .
A similar expression applies for myt,m, so that the yt,n− yt,m part in the covariance of
equation (4.7) is readily found as
yt,n − yt,m = −φ
(
1
n
− 1
m
)
µˆt +
1
2
η
(
1
n
− 1
m
)
µˆ2t , (4.17)
since both yields have identical non-stochastic parts.
The risk premium part in the covariance of (4.7) is from (4.5)
Etrxt+m,n−m =(n−m)Etyt+m,n−m +myt,m − nyt,n
=
1
2
log(1− ησ2)− 1− η
2
σ2 − (φ+ 1)
2σ2
2(1− ησ2) , (4.18)
which contains no random elements since these cancel from myt,m − nyt,n. Hence the
covariance in equation (4.7) is zero and i.i.d. fluctuations in inflation cannot explain the
expectations puzzle. This is summarized in the following.
Proposition 1. If inflation is an i.i.d. normally distributed random variable, the term
structure of interest rates conforms to the expectations hypothesis. As a result, the
values of the Campbell-Shiller regression coefficients are equal to unity.
4.2 The MA-assumption for µˆt
Next we introduce some dependence in the inflation process. Suppose the inflation
process is MA(1)
µˆt+1 = εt+1 + θεt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2) i.i.d. (4.19)
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To explain how this changes the regression coefficient, consider the simple 2-period case
with n = 2, m = 1.10 Hence,
Cov(Etrxt+m,n−m, yt,n − yt,m) = Cov(yt,1 + Etyt+1,1 − 2yt,2, yt,n − yt,m) (4.20)
To determine yt,1, note that using the MA(1) scheme (4.19) gives
yt,1 =− logEtexp
[
log δ − log µ¯− φµˆt+1 − µˆt+1 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+1 + φµˆt −
1
2
ηµˆ2t
]
= log µ¯− log δ + (φ+ 1)θεt − φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t −
1
2
ηθ2ε2t
− logEtexp
[
(ηθεt − φ− 1)εt+1 + 1
2
ηε2t+1
]
(4.21)
Using the same reasoning as we used in determining the integral Π from (4.13), we get
yt,1 = log µ¯− log δ + (φ+ 1)θεt − φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t −
1
2
ηθ2ε2t −
(ηθεt − φ− 1)2σ2
2(1− ησ2)
+
1
2
log(1− ησ2) (4.22)
under the same condition as before. Following the above approach one shows that
Et[yt+1,1] = log µ¯− log δ − φθεt + 1
2
ηθ2ε2t +
1
2
η(1− θ2)σ2 − (φ+ 1)
2σ2 + η2θ2σ4
2(1− ησ2)
+
1
2
log(1− ησ2) (4.23)
and
yt,2 = log µ¯− log δ − 1
2
φµˆt +
1
4
ηµˆ2t +
1
2
θεt − cTV T c+ 1
4
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2) , (4.24)
where yt,2 in (4.24) requires 1−ησ2(1+θ2) > 0. The cTV T c part originates from the double
integral involving εt+1 and εt+2, but is constant. Hence the cTV T c part plays no role in the
covariance.
For the covariance (4.7), we only need to consider the stochastic parts from (4.22),
(4.23) and (4.24). Doing this gives the following simplified expressions:
Etr̂xt+1,1 =
2ηθ(φ+ 1)σ2εt − η2θ2σ2ε2t
2(1− ησ2) + Λ (4.25)
10In Appendix B, we provide a complete proof for the general case of n and m.
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yˆt,2 − yˆt,1 =φ
2
µˆt − 1
4
ηµˆ2t −
(
φ+
1
2
)
θεt +
1
2
ηθ2ε2t +
η2θ2σ2ε2t − 2ηθ(φ+ 1)σ2εt
2(1− ησ2) + ∆
(4.26)
where Λ and ∆ stand for the constant parts. Since εt and ε2t are both part of Etr̂xt+1,1
in (4.25) and yˆt,2 − yˆt,1 in (4.26), it follows that the covariance between the two parts is
non-zero. Therefore we get that
Cov(Etrxt+1,1, yt,2 − yt,1)
V ar(yt,2 − yt,1) =
Cov(Etr̂xt+1,1, yˆt,2 − yˆt,1)
V ar(yˆt,2 − yˆt,1) 6= 0.
Hence the regression coefficient βˆ in (4.7) will differ from unity.
For the results of longer horizons, see the Appendix. In summary, we find, with the
assumption that µˆt is a MA(1) process, the slope coefficient βn,(m=1) in regression (4.3)
deviates from 1. For any of the cases m ≥ 2, the slope coefficient βn,(m≥2) is still equal to
unity, however.11 We capture this result in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. If the inflation is an MA(1) process, the values of the Campbell-Shiller
regression coefficients are no longer equal to unity for m = 1. If m is equal or
larger than two, the values of the Campbell-Shiller regression coefficients are equal
to unity.
The intuition for this result follows from the feature of the MA(1) process. We know
that the expected excess returns Etrxt+m,n−m, i.e. the risk premium, depends on the ex-
pected aggregate inflation over the period that starts at t + m and ends at the maturity
date t + n. If Etµˆt+1 = θεt and Etµˆt+i = 0, i ≥ 2, the expected one period ahead infla-
tion becomes Etµt+1 = µ¯ + θεt and Etµt+i = µ¯, for i ≥ 2. So the expected one period
ahead excess return Etrxt+1,n−1 becomes time varying, because Etµˆt+1 6= Et′ µˆt′+1, as long
as εt 6= εt′ . The Etrxt+1,n−1 and yt,n − yt,1 depend on the state of the starting date “t”,
and both contain the current innovation εt. From an unconditional perspective the two
terms are therefore correlated with each other, so that βn,1 6= 1. However, for m ≥ 2, the
expected inflations from period t+m to t+ n are constants (Etµt+i = µ¯, for i ≥ 2), hence
the expected excess return Etrxt+m,n−m is a constant and independent of the starting date
t. The Etrxt+m,n−m is therefore not correlated with yt,n − yt,1, and hence βn,(m≥2) = 1.
11For the derivations, see Appendix B
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In order to provide values of βn,1 under the MA(1)-inflation, we need to calibrate the
parameter values. The parameters we need are η, φ, θ and σ. Since φ and η are direct-
ly unobservable, the starting values of φ and η that we use are borrowed from Alvarez,
Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009).12 Table 2 shows values of βn,1 under different values of θ
(from 0.1-0.9) with σ equal to 0.0033 and 0.0115 respectively.13 The value of 0.0033 is the
average sample standard deviation for monthly inflation for the countries used in Section
1 from Feb 1990 to Dec 1999 and the value of 0.0115 is the average sample standard devi-
ation for yearly inflation in these countries during the same time period. One sees from
Table 2 that if the volatility is small (σ = 0.0033), the values of βn,1 are around unity with
tiny deviations, no matter what the value of θ is. So the expectations hypothesis holds for
a low volatility process. While an increase in money growth volatility (σ = 0.0115) also
increases deviations of βn,1 from unity, these deviations are still too small to match the
data. The results, however, do show deviations of βn,1 take two directions. The βn,1 first
increases with θ and peaks at θ = 0.4 and then decreases with θ.
In summary, the assumption of an MA(1) process for inflation implies deviations of
βn,1 that are too small in comparison with the deviations in the data. More importantly,
the MA(1)-assumption for inflation can at most account for the deviation from unity of
βn,1. It is unable to account for the deviation of any βn,m with m ≥ 2.
Even though the MA(1) process is unable to match the data, the analysis provides
the theoretical intuition for deviations of βˆ from unity. Continuing along these lines, one
shows that an MA(2) process can explain deviations from of βn,1 and βn,2. Because the
data reveal deviations at higher orders and because of the magnitude mismatch, we turn
to AR processes.
4.3 The AR(1)-assumption for µˆt
Consider the case when µˆt is an AR(1) process, i.e. µˆt+1 = ρµˆt + εt+1. Since the
expectations hypothesis is also rejected at the real level, we check the behavior of both
nominal yields and real yields under AR(1) inflation.14 Since higher order AR process are
12Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009) find the values of φ and η by solving (3.8) and (3.9) with the assump-
tion that the endowment is 1.
13When choosing the values for σ and η, one constraint is that ησ2 < 1. See Appendix B.2 for an explana-
tion.
14All the proofs and calculations are shown in Appendix B. The parameters we need for the calculation are
σ ρ, φ and η. In the case of MA(1)-inflation, we drop the effects of φ and η for simplicity. Here, in addition
to σ and ρ, we also discuss the effect of φ. It is clear that η is also important. However, according to the
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analytically intractable, we resort to numerical procedure for analyzing these cases. But
we do provide explicit expression for the AR(1) case.
Table 3 gives the values of slope coefficients and shows how these values vary with
σ, ρ and φ. Panel A gives the values of slope coefficient for nominal yields and Panel B
gives the values of slope coefficient for real yields. The coefficients for both the nominal
and the real yields have similar trends.
Low money growth volatility (σ = 0.0033) generates slope coefficients around 1. With
larger volatility (σ = 0.0115 or 0.0180), deviations of β2,1 (and β∗2,1) from 1 increase. At the
lower value of volatility (σ = 0.0033), deviations of β2,1 (and β∗2,1) are only upward, i.e. β2,1
(and β∗2,1) > 1. These deviations increase with ρ and φ. At the higher values of volatility
(σ = 0.0115 or 0.0180), the deviations start to take two directions. At the lower values
of ρ, β2,1 (and β∗2,1) are biased upwards. With higher values of autocorrelation ρ, the β2,1
(and β∗2,1) falls below unity and can even become negative. If σ takes the higher values,
the effect of φ is ambiguous . When ρ ≤ 0.4, increasing the value of the elasticity φ may
strengthen the deviation, however, when ρ ≥ 0.5, the effect is reversed.
The relation between slope coefficients and parameters is thus quite complex. One
clear message from this table is that large deviations for β from unity occur only if the
variation of the risk premium is sizeable.
Intuitively, the greater the volatility, the higher the risk and hence the risk premium
is larger. A larger value of ρ means the effect of a shock persists longer, so the risk is also
greater. As a result, a higher risk premium is required. Recall that φ is the elasticity of
the marginal utility of active households to the change in money growth. Intuitively, the
larger the value of φ is, the more sensitive the active households are to a change in the
money growth rate and hence they ask for higher risk premia. This intuition becomes
clear, if we consider a specific functional form for the preference of the agents. In the case
of constant relative risk aversion preferences are U(c) = c1−τ/(1− τ) and φ takes the form
φ = τ
d log cA(µ)
d logµ
(4.27)
Thus φ is proportional to the risk aversion coefficient τ . Therefore, the more the house-
holds are averse to risk, the larger the value of φ will be and the higher the risk premium
definition of η and φ, i.e. η = −∂φ/∂µ, the economic implications of η should be covered by φ, so we drop
the discussion for η and only discuss the effects of σ ρ, and φ for the value of β.
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will be.
So the size of the risk premium is proportional to the values of σ, ρ and φ. Large
risk premia guarantee that the variation of risk premia is larger and hence the deviation
of β from unity may also be large. But this does not mean that the deviation is linearly
proportional to the size of the risk premia. Equation (4.7) tells us that the value of β
depends on the covariance of the time-varying risk premia and the spread yt,n− yt,m, and
the variance of yt,n−yt,m. The sign of the covariance decides the direction of the deviation,
while the ratio of the covariance and the variance decides the magnitude of the deviation.
We cannot tell exactly how the variation of the risk premia affects the direction and the
magnitude of the deviation. According to Table 3, one thing is clear that to get a negative
β, both σ and ρ must be large enough. The 3D plots of Figure 1 and Figure 2 show how
the regression slope coefficients for the nominal and the real yields vary with the σ and
ρ. The plots clearly show that as the values of σ and ρ increase, the values of β2,1 and β∗2,1
first increase slightly and then decrease rapidly and turn negative.
The above analysis is based on the explicit analytical results for β2,1 (β∗2,1) and AR(1).
For βn,m in general the analytical solutions become unwieldy, but can be easily analyzed
with simulated data. In the next section, we will use numerical methods to generate the
βn,m and β∗n,m with n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2 to check our intuition.
5 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we use simulated yield data to validate the analytical results for the
cases that inflation is an i.i.d. process or follows an MA(1) process. For the AR(1) pro-
cess the analytical solutions become unwieldy, but can be easily tracked numerically. By
varying the parameter values we can investigate the conditions under which the βˆ is con-
siderably less than one or is even negative.
Expression for the bond yields are given in (4.12), (B.6) and (B.9) and (B.21) for the
case that inflation is an i.i.d. process, a MA(1) or an AR(1) process, respectively. Based
on these yield equations, we can simulate the bond yield for any length of period and
maturity. The data is generated under the assumption that money growth follows an i.i.d
variable, MA(1) and AR(1) process respectively. For each specific process, we conducted
200 simulations and each of these simulations run for 200 time periods.
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The calibration of the parameters is as in Section 4. We choose µ¯ = 1.05, which says
that the mean of the one-period inflation rate is 5%. The scale of one period is a year.
5.1 Money growth is i.i.d. variable
Table 4 shows the average values of β for nominal yields over 200 simulations based
on the assumption that inflation is an i.i.d. variable. Figure 3 and Figure 4 plot the values
of β10,1 and β10,2 for the 200 simulations. The results show that the average values of sim-
ulated β are quite close to 1. This is consistent with the theoretical results in case inflation
is an i.i.d. random variable. In that case the term structure of interest rates conforms to
the expectations hypothesis and βˆ is expected to be 1.
5.2 Money growth follows a MA(1) process
Table 5 shows the average values of β for nominal yields over 200 simulations based
on the assumption that inflation follows a MA(1) process. Figure 5 and Figure 6 plot the
values of β10,1 and β10,2 for the 200 simulations.
We showed that if money growth follows a MA(1) process, the regression coefficient
βn,1 can deviate from unity due to the time-varying risk. The magnitude of deviation
depends on the values of σ, θ and φ. The simulation results of βn,1 are consistent with
the theoretical results. Both show a tiny but clearly discernable deviation from unity.
The MA(1) inflation cannot, however, account for large deviations of β1,n from unity for
given variations of the input parameters. The determinant for the time-varying risk is the
aggregate expected inflation from period t + 1 to t + n. If inflation is a MA(1) process,
the expected inflation is only time varying in period t + 1, since a shock dies out after
two periods. In comparison to the AR(1) case, the MA(1) case can only generate small
variations in risk. As a result, the deviation of the regression coefficients from unity is
then smaller. Theoretically, the value of any βn,m with m ≥ 2 is 1 and the average values
of the simulated βn,2 are closer to 1 than those of βn,1.
5.3 Money growth follows an AR(1) process
In Section 4, we prove that the expectations hypothesis may not hold if inflation fol-
lows an AR(1) process. In the case of AR(1) inflation, the theoretical values of β2,1 for both
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the nominal and the real yields are close in magnitude to those in the data. We do not cal-
culate the theoretical values of βn,m and β∗n,m with n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2 due to the complexity
of the calculations. However, it is intuitive that the rejection of EH is not limited to n = 2
and m = 1 in the case of AR(1) inflation. We now simulate the nominal and the real yield-
s with the yield equations (B.21) and (B.39) and run regressions (4.3) with the simulated
yields to obtain values for the slope coefficients. In order to check the difference of slope
coefficients in the case of lower and higher risk, we use two combinations of values for σ
and ρ, with σ = 0.0080 and ρ = 0.6 as the lower values and σ = 0.0115 and ρ = 0.9 as the
higher values.
Table 6 shows the average values of βn,m and β∗n,m from 200 simulations. Panel A
shows the values of β¯n,m and Panel B shows the values of β¯∗n,m. The results are consistent
with the theoretical calculations. The volume of the risk may change the direction of the
rejection of the EH. When both σ and ρ or either one of these takes the lower value, the
risk is lower and the average values of βn,m are larger than unity. When both σ and ρ take
on higher values, the risk is higher and the average values of βn,m are less than unity and
can even turn negative. The magnitude of the deviation from the expectations hypothesis
matches the magnitude observed in the data. In the case of higher risk, we observe that β
is decreasing in maturity n.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 plot β10,1 and β10,2 for all the 200 simulations under σ = 0.0115
and ρ = 0.9. Due to the larger variation in risk, the simulated βˆ is more dispersed under
AR(1)-inflation. If we suppose that each single simulation represents a specific economy,
we see that the yield regression coefficients may be quite different for different economies,
even if these share the same inflation processes. Nevertheless, the average values for β10,1
and β10,2 are -0.3352 and -0.2235 and most of the simulations give negative β10,1 and β10,2
values. The dispersion is large since the maximum and minimum values for β10,1 and
β10,2 are approximately 2 and -2. Figure 9 and Figure 10 plot β∗10,1 and β∗10,2 for all the
200 simulations under σ = 0.0115 and ρ = 0.9. The plots of β∗10,1 and β∗10,2 show similar
distributions for β10,1 and β10,2, but with lower mean values. The largest and least values
for β∗10,1 and β∗10,2 are around 0.5 and -3 respectively.
Next, we compare the yield curves that we simulated with the real data. Figure 11
shows the average Euro-rate curves for 5 countries with maturities up to 60 months from
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January 1995 to December 1999.15 We see that all the yield curves slope upward with
yields increasing with maturity.
Figure 12 shows the average nominal yield curves we simulated with different values
for σ and ρ. The figure also shows the yield curve based on the i.i.d.-inflation that is
used as a control to show the term structure with constant risk premium under which the
expectations hypothesis holds. Like in the real data, all the simulated yield curves have
typical upward slopes. It appears that the yield curve based on the i.i.d.-inflation shows
the largest curvature and the yield curves based on the inflation with large value of the
autoregressive coefficient (L,H and H,H) are relatively flatter. Figure 13 shows the average
real yield curves. The real yield curves show similar patterns to the nominal ones, but are
about 5% lower than the nominal yields. The reason is that we choose 5% as the mean of
annual inflation.
Combining both the analytical and numerical results, we have the following result
for AR(1)-inflation in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. If inflation is an AR(1) process, the values of the Campbell-Shiller
regression coefficients can differ considerably from unity. The values can be higher
or lower than unity and can be even negative. The values depend on the autocor-
relation and volatility of inflation.
5.4 Robustness check
In Section 4, we solve a consumption-based asset pricing model and obtain the term
structure of interest rates in the case that inflation is an i.i.d. random variable, or follows
an MA(1) or an AR(1) processes. Obviously, the i.i.d. variable, MA(1) and AR(1) processes
cannot represent all types of inflation in reality. Besides the AR(1) process, the AR(4)
and the AR(12) processes are often applied to quarterly and monthly inflation. Cecchetti
and Debelle (2006) indicate “the AR coefficient is often close to one in a large number of
countries when estimated on inflation data over the past twenty years.” In order to check
whether the model has the power to explain the expectations puzzle if inflation is more
like an AR(4) or AR(12) process, we also simulate the nominal and the real yields based on
equations (4.10) and (B.38). According to the law of large numbers, the expected values in
15Only 5 of the countries from Table 4.3 have yields with maturities up to 60 months.
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equations (4.10) and (B.38) can be approximated by the average values of a large number
of random values in the brackets of equations (4.10) and (B.38). In order to ensure that the
numbers of random values are large enough, so that the averages of these random values
converge to the means of the random values, we calculate 200000 times the random values
in the brackets of equations (4.10) and (B.38) and then take the average of these values as
the approximation of the expected values.
The results are given in Table 7 and Table 8. The Tables show that the yields simulated
based on AR(4) or AR(12) inflation have negative regression coefficients for most of ma-
turities. These results indicate that the model that we use is robust to other AR processes
for inflation in accounting for the rejection of the EH. Actually, with equations (4.10) and
(B.38) and reliance on the law of large numbers, we can simulate the nominal and the real
yields based on any inflation process, not only the AR processes, but also more complicat-
ed processes. According to our analysis, these more complicated processes are promising
for generating yields with term structures that reject EH as long as they can provide large
and persistent variation in the risk premium. But the AR(1) assumption for inflation suf-
fices to explain the expectations puzzle and the simulated yield curves based on AR(1)
inflation also match the data.
6 Empirical Test
Both the theoretical and numerical results in this paper show that when either the
volatility (σ) or the autoregressive coefficient for AR(1) inflation (ρ) or both take on small
values, the yield regression coefficients are larger than unity, while if both have large val-
ues, the yield regression coefficients are smaller than unity and may even be negative. If
this holds in the data, we should expect that when we cross sectionally regress βˆ onto σˆ
and ρˆ, the coefficients for σ and ρ should at least not both be positive. If both coefficients
are negative, this would provide clear empirical support for the inverse relation between
βˆ and (σˆ, ρˆ). In this section, we conduct such regressions as an indirect test of the above
theoretically deduced relation between βˆ on the one hand and σ and ρ on the other hand,
so as to see whether our theory matches the data in this subtle detail.
We collected monthly inflation rates for 15 countries from Feb 1990 to Dec 1999.16
16The 15 countries are the same as those listed in Table 1, with the exception of Aus and Nzl. Australia and
New Zealand were excluded because the monthly inflation rates for these two countries are unavailable.
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We fitted an AR(1) process to obtain the sample autoregression coefficient (ρˆ) for each
country.17 The time period we use for inflation is 5 years prior to the time period that we
use for the interest rates. This is done on the grounds that investors look back to determine
their expectations regarding future inflation.
Table 9 shows the values of the sample autoregression coefficient (ρˆ) and the sample
standard deviation (σˆ). The values of ρˆ for Belgium and Norway are very small (ρˆ <
0.1) and the probabilities for ρˆ = 0 are higher than 40%. This means that the goodness-
of-fit of the two countries is very low. We decided that is inappropriate to model the
inflation processes of Belgium and Norway as an AR(1) process, so we exclude the two
observations in the subsequent regressions.
We regress βn,m onto ρˆ and σˆ cross sectionally over the different countries for given
n,m as in
βn,m = const+ bn,mρˆ+ dn,mσˆ + error (6.1)
The regression results are shown in Table 10. We can see that almost all the regression
coefficients are negative, except d6,3 and d12,3. Most of the regression coefficients are not
statistically significant, though, only b3,1 and d3,1 are statistically significant. The F-tests
nevertheless say that the R2 for many regressions are not low. Taking the extremely small
sample sizes into account (only 11-13 observations), the results seem not disappointing. It
is reasonable to believe that the statistical significance would improve if we had more ob-
servations for the regressions. So we conclude that the negative coefficients demonstrate,
to some extent, the negative correlations between β and ρ and σ in the data. At least, the
evidence does not go in the other direction.
7 Conclusions
We build on the endogenously segmented market model of Alvarez, Atkeson, and
Kehoe (2009) to explain the expectations puzzle by introducing autocorrelated inflation.
We formulate a consumption-based asset pricing model in which the risk premium for
both the nominal and the real yields can vary in response to expected changes in inflation.
In the theoretical part, we analyze three types of inflation, i.e. inflation is an i.i.d. random
17Obviously, AR(1) is not suitable for all inflation process, but we can not find a process which fits all
inflations equally well. However, in order to be consistent with our theoretical analysis, we only use the
AR(1) process to fit all inflations here.
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variable, or follows an MA(1) or an AR(1) process. The analytical solutions show that the
i.i.d-process for inflation cannot solve the expectations puzzle because the risk premium
is constant under the i.i.d-inflation. If inflation follows an MA(1) process, the risk premia
become time varying. Due to the rather small variation in risk premia, the MA(1) process
for inflation can only generate tiny deviation of β from unity. Only the AR(1) process for
inflation can generate enough variation in risk premia to account for the rejection of the
expectations hypothesis. The numerical results show that the rejection of EH is robust to
the AR(4) and AR(12) processes for inflation.
Our empirical tests for the EH with the Euro-rates of 17 countries show that the re-
jection of the EH goes in two directions. For some countries, such as Australia, we get
negative regression coefficients. For other countries, such as France, the regression co-
efficients are significantly larger than unity. This phenomenon can be addressed by the
segmented market model. Both the theoretical and the numerical results show that the
regression coefficients would first increase (β > 1) and then decrease (β < 1) following an
increase of the risk premium.
The result that the negative regression coefficients appear only if inflation has a large
volatility and a high autoregressive coefficient imply that there exists a negative relation
between β, σ and ρ. To test this prediction we regressed βn,m for 13 countries onto the
sample standard deviations and the sample autoregressive coefficients for their inflations.
The regression coefficients for most of the βn,m are negative. Even though most of the
coefficients are not statistically significant due to the extremely small sample size, the
results do not run counter to the predictions. According to our segmented market model,
the simulated yields curves have the typical upward sloping term structure for both the
nominal and the real yields and their magnitudes match the data. All of these results
show that the endogenously segmented market model provides a reliable framework for
exploring the underlying mechanisms that determine the character of the term structure.
The model also has its limitations. The only source for time-varying risk in this model
is inflation. Duffee (2011) and Chernov and Mueller (2012) find there may be other latent
factor(s) hidden in the yield curve besides inflation. Bansal and Shaliastovich (2012) and
Rudebusch and Wu (2008) show that both output and inflation are sources of time-vary
risk in the term structure of interest rates. To keep the analysis simple, the endogenously
segmented market model that we use adopts an endowment economy with constant peri-
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od by period income, so we do not investigate the effect of variation in output. The effect
of output on the term structure of interest rates seems feasible within this model, and is of
interest for future work. While it is not easy to reconcile all the factors in one model, this
should be a subject of future research concerning the term structure of interest rates.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs and derivations of section 2
A.1 The derivation of equation (3.9)
The Lagrangian is given by
L =U(cA(µ))F (γ¯(µ), µ) + U (y/µ) [1− F (γ¯(µ), µ)]
+ λ
{
y − cA(µ)F (γ¯(µ), µ)−
∫ γ¯(µ)
0
γf(γ, µ)dγ − (y/µ) [1− F (γ¯(µ), µ)]
}
(A.1)
The relevant F.O.C. are
∂L
∂cA(µ)
= 0 : U ′(cA(µ)) = λ (A.2)
∂L
∂γ¯(µ)
= 0 : U(cA(µ))− U(y/µ) + λ [(y/µ)− γ¯(µ)− cA(µ)] = 0 (A.3)
Plug (A.2) into (A.3), to derive (3.9). Q.E.D.
When (3.9) is rewritten as (A.4), we can see that the marginal utility of active house-
holds is equal to the ratio of the utility difference and the consumption difference minus
the cost.
U ′(cA(µ)) =
U(cA(µ))− U(y/µ)
cA(µ)− (y/µ)− γ¯(µ) (A.4)
B Proofs and derivations of section 3
B.1 Derivation of the slope coefficient βn,m
Note
Cov(x, y) =Cov(x, y − x) + Cov(x, x)
=Cov(x, y − x) + V ar(x)
Cov(x+ z, y) = Cov(x, y) + Cov(z, y)
Cov(kx, y) = kCov(x, y)
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Cov(x, y) = Cov(y, x)
yi =β0 + βixi + ε
βi =
Σni=1(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)
Σni=1(xi − x¯)2
=
Cov(x, y)
V ar(x)
In our case,
x =
m
n−m(yt,n − yt,m)
y =yt+m,n−m − yt,n
V ar(x) =
m2
(n−m)2V ar(yt,n − yt,m)
βn,m =
Cov(yt+m,n−m − yt,n, m(n−m)(yt,n − yt,m))
m2
(n−m)2V ar(yt,n − yt,m)
=
Cov((n−m)(yt+m,n−m − yt,n),m(yt,n − yt,m))
m2V ar(yt,n − yt,m)
=
Cov((n−m)yt+m,n−m − nyt,n +myt,m +m(yt,n − yt,m),m(yt,n − yt,m))
m2V ar(yt,n − yt,m)
=
Cov(Etrxt+m,n−m, yt,n − yt,m)
mV ar(yt,n − yt,m) + 1 Q.E.D.
B.2 Derivation of the results under the i.i.d-Assumption for µˆt+i
With the quadratic approximation and the definition of the pricing kernel, we have:
nyt,n =− logEtexp
[
n(log δ − log µ¯)− (φ+ 1)µˆt+n −
n−1∑
i=1
µˆt+i +
1
2
ηµˆ2t+n + φµˆt −
1
2
ηµˆ2t
]
=n(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t − logEtexp
[
−
n−1∑
i=1
µˆt+i − (φ+ 1)µˆt+n + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+n
]
=n(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt + η
2
µˆ2t +
n− 1
2
σ2 − logEtexp
[
−(φ+ 1)εt+n + η
2
ε2t+n
]
It’s known that if x is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2 and satisfies
1− 2bσ2 > 0, then
Eexp
(
ax+ bx2
)
= exp
(
1
2
a2σ2
1− 2bσ2
)(
1
1− 2bσ2
) 1
2
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In our case, x = εt+n, a = −(φ+ 1) and b = η2 .
Hence, under the assumption 1− ησ2 > 0
logEtexp
[
−(φ+ 1)εt+n + η
2
ε2t+n
]
=
(φ+ 1)2σ2
2(1− ησ2) −
1
2
log(1− ησ2)
So
nyt,n =n(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt + η
2
µˆ2t +
n− 1
2
σ2 − (φ+ 1)
2σ2
2(1− ησ2) +
1
2
log(1− ησ2) (B.1)
With a similar derivation, we get
myt,m =m(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt + η
2
µˆ2t +
m− 1
2
σ2 − (φ+ 1)
2σ2
2(1− ησ2) +
1
2
log(1− ησ2) (B.2)
(n−m)yt+m,n−m
=− logEt+mexp
[
(n−m)(log δ − log µ¯)− (φ+ 1)µˆt+n −
n−m−1∑
i=1
µˆt+m+i +
1
2
ηµˆ2t+n + φµˆt+m −
1
2
ηµˆ2t+m
]
=(n−m)(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt+m + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+m − logEt+mexp
[
−(φ+ 1)µˆt+n −
n−m−1∑
i=1
µˆt+m+i +
1
2
ηµˆ2t+n
]
=(n−m)(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt+m + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+m +
n−m− 1
2
σ2 − (φ+ 1)
2σ2
2(1− ησ2) +
1
2
log(1− ησ2)
So
Etrxt+m,n−m =Et[(n−m)yt+m,n−m +myt,m − nyt,n]
=(n−m)Etyt+m,n−m +myt,m − nyt,n
myt,m − nyt,n = −(n−m)(log µ¯− log δ) + n−m
2
σ2
(n−m)Etyt+m,n−m =(n−m)(log µ¯− log δ) + η + n−m− 1
2
σ2 − (φ+ 1)
2σ2
2(1− ησ2) (B.3)
+
1
2
log(1− ησ2)
Etrxt+m,n−m =
1
2
log(1− ησ2)− 1− η
2
σ2 − (φ+ 1)
2σ2
2(1− ησ2)
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So If the money growth deviation µˆt+i are i.i.d random variables, then Etrxt+m,n−m is a
constant. Hence,
Cov(Etrxt+m,n−m, yt,n − yt,m)
mV ar(yt,n − yt,m) = 0, β = 1
B.3 Derivation of the results under the MA-Assumption for µˆt+i
By the definition, n ≥ 2, so
nyt,n(n ≥ 2)
=− logEtexp
[
n(log δ − log µ¯)− φµˆt+n −
n∑
i=1
µˆt+i +
1
2
ηµˆ2t+n + φµˆt −
1
2
ηµˆ2t
]
=n(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t − logEtexp
(
−
n∑
i=1
µˆt+i − φµˆt+n + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+n
)
=n(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t + θεt
− logEtexp
{
−(θ + 1)
n−2∑
i=1
εt+i − [θ(φ+ 1) + 1]εt+n−1 − (φ+ 1)εt+n + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+n
}
=n(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t + θεt +
1
2
(n− 2)(θ + 1)2σ2−
logEtexp
{
−[θ(φ+ 1) + 1]εt+n−1 − (φ+ 1)εt+n + 1
2
ηθ2ε2t+n−1 + ηθεt+n−1εt+n +
1
2
ηε2t+n
}
(B.4)
Let
ε =
 εt+n−1
εt+n
 ∼ N(0,Σ), and Σ = σ2I2, BTB = 1
2
η
 θ2 θ
θ 1

and
c =
 −12 [θ(φ+ 1) + 1]
−12(φ+ 1)

the equation can be wrriten as a matrix form
nyt,n
=n(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t + θεt +
1
2
(n− 2)(θ + 1)2σ2 (B.5)
− logEtexp
(
εTBTBε+ εT c+ cT ε
)
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=n(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t + θεt +
1
2
(n− 2)(θ + 1)2σ2 − 2cTV T c
+
1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2) (B.6)
where V =
(
Σ−1 − 2BTB)−1.
The following is the general rule for multivariate integration we used in this paper:
µˆt =A0 +A1ε
nY =B0 +B1µˆt + µˆtB2µˆt
Y =B0 +B1A0 +B1A1ε
Bε+ εT c+ cT ε ε ∼ N(0,Σ), Σ = σ2In
Eexp
(
εTBTBε+ εT c+ cT ε
)
=
∮
Rn
1
(2pi)
n
2 |Σ| 12
exp
(
εTBTBε+ εT c+ cT ε
)
exp
(
−1
2
εTΣ−1ε
)
dε
=
∮
Rn
1
(2pi)
n
2 |Σ| 12
exp
[
−εT
(
1
2
Σ−1 −BTB
)
ε+ εT c+ cT ε
]
dε
We denote
1
2
Σ−1 −BTB = 1
2
V −1 i.e. V =
(
Σ−1 − 2BTB)−1 and c = 1
2
V −1ν, i.e. ν = 2V c
then
− εT (Σ−1 −BTB) ε+ εT c+ cT ε
=− εT (Σ−1 −BTB) ε+ εT c+ cT ε− 1
2
νTV −1ν +
1
2
νTV −1ν
=− 1
2
(ε− ν)TV −1(ε− ν) + 1
2
νTV −1ν
so
Eexp
(
εTBTBε+ εT c+ cT ε
)
=
∮
Rn
1
(2pi)
n
2 |Σ| 12
exp
[
−1
2
(ε− ν)TV −1(ε− ν) + 1
2
νTV −1ν
]
dε
=
∮
Rn
1
(2pi)
n
2 |Σ| 12
exp
[
−1
2
(ε− ν)TV −1(ε− ν)
]
dεexp
(
1
2
νTV −1ν
)
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=
1
|Σ| 12
1
|Σ−1 − 2BTB| 12
exp
(
1
2
νTV −1ν
)
=
1
|Σ| 12
1
|Σ−1 − 2BTB| 12
exp
(
cTV T c
)
=
exp
(
cTV T c
)
|In − 2Inσ2BTB|
1
2
According to (4.19), we derive the expressions of myt,m in the cases of m = 1 and
m ≥ 2 separately.
If m ≥ 2, with similar derivation, we have:
myt,m
=m(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t + θεt +
1
2
(m− 2)(θ + 1)2σ2 (B.7)
− logEtexp
(
εˆTBTBεˆ+ εˆT c+ cT εˆ
)
=m(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t + θεt +
1
2
(m− 2)(θ + 1)2σ2 − 2cTV T c
+
1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2) (B.8)
where
εˆ =
 εt+m−1
εt+m
 ∼ N(0,Σ), and Σ = σ2I2
If m=1, myt,m = yt,1, and
yt,1 =− logEtexp
[
log δ − log µ¯− φµˆt+1 − µˆt+1 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+1 + φµˆt −
1
2
ηµˆ2t
]
= log µ¯− log δ + (φ+ 1)θεt − φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t −
1
2
ηθ2ε2t
− logEtexp
[
(ηθεt − φ− 1)εt+1 + 1
2
ηε2t+1
]
= log µ¯− log δ + (φ+ 1)θεt − φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t −
1
2
ηθ2ε2t −
(ηθεt − φ− 1)2σ2
2(1− ησ2)
+
1
2
log(1− ησ2) (B.9)
For the same reason, we should derive the expressions of (n−m)yt+m,n−m in the cases
of n−m = 1 and n−m ≥ 2 separately.
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B.3.1 Results of n-m=1
If n−m = 1, (n−m)yt+m,n−m = yt+m,1,
yt+m,1 =− logEt+mexp
[
log δ − log µ¯− φµˆt+m+1 − µˆt+m+1 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+m+1 + φµˆt −
1
2
ηµˆ2t
]
= log µ¯− log δ + (φ+ 1)θεt+m − φµˆt+m + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+m −
1
2
ηθ2ε2t+m
− logEt+mexp
[
(ηθεt+m − φ− 1)εt+m+1 + 1
2
ηε2t+m+1
]
= log µ¯− log δ + (φ+ 1)θεt+m − φµˆt+m + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+m −
1
2
ηθ2ε2t+m
− (ηθεt+m − φ− 1)
2σ2
2(1− ησ2) +
1
2
log(1− ησ2)
a. If m ≥ 2, then
Et[yt+m,1] = log µ¯− log δ + 1
2
η(θ2 + 1)σ2 − (φ− 1)
2σ2 + η2θ2σ4
2(1− ησ2) +
1
2
log(1− ησ2)
is a constant.
Moreover, for m ≥ 2,
myt,m − nyt,n = (m− n)(log µ¯− log δ) + 1
2
(m− n)(θ + 1)2σ2 (B.10)
is a constant too.
The value of Etrxt+m,n−m = Et[yt+m,1] + myt,m − nyt,n is the difference of two constants,
which must be a constant. Hence
Cov(Etrxt+m,n−m, yt,n − yt,m)
mV ar(yt,n − yt,m) = 0, β = 1
b. If m = 1, then yt+m,1 = yt+1,1, and
Et[yt+1,1] = log µ¯− log δ − φθεt + 1
2
ηθ2ε2t +
1
2
η(1− θ2)σ2 − (φ+ 1)
2σ2 + η2θ2σ4
2(1− ησ2)
+
1
2
log(1− ησ2)
For m = 1, since n−m = 1, so n = 2, and then
yt,1 − 2yt,2 =2cTV T c− log µ¯+ log δ + φθεt − 1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2
1− ησ2
)
− 1
2
ηθ2ε2t
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− (ηθεt − φ− 1)
2σ2
2(1− ησ2) (B.11)
Etrxt+1,1 =Et[yt+1,1] + yt,1 − 2yt,2
=2cTV T c− 1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2
1− ησ2
)
− (ηθεt − φ− 1)
2σ2
2(1− ησ2) + log(1− ησ
2)
+
1
2
η(1− θ2)σ2 − (φ+ 1)
2σ2 + η2θ2σ4
2(1− ησ2) (B.12)
yt,2 − yt,1 =φ
2
µˆt − 1
4
ηµˆ2t −
(
φ+
1
2
)
θεt +
1
2
ηθ2ε2t +
(ηθεt − φ− 1)2σ2
2(1− ησ2) − c
TV T c
+
1
4
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2)− 1
2
log(1− ησ2) (B.13)
Dropping the constant part of Etrxt+1,1 and yt,2 − yt,1, we get
Etr̂xt+1,1 =
2ηθ(φ+ 1)σ2εt − η2θ2σ2ε2t
2(1− ησ2) (B.14)
yˆt,2 − yˆt,1 =φ
2
µˆt − 1
4
ηµˆ2t −
(
φ+
1
2
)
θεt +
1
2
ηθ2ε2t +
η2θ2σ2ε2t − 2ηθ(φ+ 1)σ2εt
2(1− ησ2) (B.15)
Cov(Etrxt+1,1, yt,2 − yt,1)
V ar(yt,2 − yt,1) =
Cov(Etr̂xt+1,1, yˆt,2 − yˆt,1)
V ar(yˆt,2 − yˆt,1) 6= 0⇒ β 6= 1
B.3.2 Results of n−m ≥ 2
If n−m ≥ 2, then
(n−m)yt+m,n−m
=− logEt+mexp
[
(n−m)(log δ − log µ¯)− φµˆt+n −
n−m∑
i=1
µˆt+m+i +
1
2
ηµˆ2t+n + φµˆt+m −
1
2
ηµˆ2t+m
]
=(n−m)(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt+m + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+m + θεt+m +
1
2
(n−m− 2)(θ + 1)2σ2
− logEt+mexp
(
εTBTBε+ εT c+ cT ε
)
=(n−m)(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt+m + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+m + θεt+m +
1
2
(n−m− 2)(θ + 1)2σ2
− 2cTV T c+ 1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2)
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where
ε =
 εt+n−1
εt+n
 ∼ N(0,Σ), and Σ = σ2I2
a. if m ≥ 2,
Et[(n−m)yt+m,n−m]
=(n−m)(log µ¯− log δ) + 1
2
(n−m− 2)(θ + 1)2σ2 − 2cTV T c+ 1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2)
+ Et
[
−φµˆt+m + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+m + θεt+m
]
=(n−m)(log µ¯− log δ) + 1
2
(n−m− 2)(θ + 1)2σ2 − 2cTV T c+ 1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2)
+ Et
[
(θ − φ)εt+m + θεt+m−1 + η
2
(ε2t+m + θ
2ε2t+m−1 + 2θεt+mεt+m−1)
]
=(n−m)(log µ¯− log δ) + 1
2
(n−m− 2)(θ + 1)2σ2 + η
2
(θ2 + 1)σ2
− 2cTV T c+ 1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2)
Et[(n−m)yt+m,n−m] is a constant.
Etrxt+m,n−m =Et[(n−m)yt+m,n−m] +myt,m − nyt,n (B.16)
If m ≥ 2, as (B.10) indicates, nyt,n −myt,m is a constant too, so Etrxt+m,n−m is a constant.
Hence
Cov(Etrxt+m,n−m, yt,n − yt,m)
mV ar(yt,n − yt,m) = 0, β = 1
b. If m = 1, then myt,m − nyt,n = yt,1 − nyt,n, and
yt,1 − nyt,n =− (n− 1)(log µ¯− log δ) + φθεt + 2cTV T c− 1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2
1− ησ2
)
− 1
2
ηθ2ε2t −
(ηθεt − φ− 1)2σ2
2(1− ησ2) −
1
2
(n− 2)(θ + 1)2σ2 (B.17)
And Et[(n−m)yt+m,n−m] = Et[(n− 1)yt+1,n−1]
Et[(n− 1)yt+1,n−1] =(n− 1)(log µ¯− log δ)− φθεt + 1
2
ηθ2ε2t +
1
2
(n− 3)(θ + 1)2σ2
+
η
2
(θ2 + 1)σ2 +
1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2θ2)− 2cTV T c (B.18)
34
We denote E˜trxt+1,n−1 as a approximate of Etrxt+1,n−1, which does not contain the con-
stant terms of Etrxt+1,n−1, then
Etr˜xt+1,n−1 =
2ηθ(φ+ 1)σ2εt − η2θ2σ2ε2t
2(1− ησ2) (B.19)
We denote ny˜t,n− y˜t,1 as a approximate of nyt,n−yt,1, which does not contain the constant
terms of nyt,n − yt,1, then
ny˜t,n−y˜t,1 = (1− 1
n
)φµˆt+(
1
2n
−1
2
)ηµˆ2t+
(
1
n
− φ− 1
)
θεt+
1
2
ηθ2ε2t+
η2θ2σ2ε2t − 2ηθ(φ+ 1)σ2εt
2(1− ησ2)
(B.20)
Cov(Etrxt+1,n−1, yt,n − yt,1)
V ar(yt,n − yt,1) =
Cov(Etr˜xt+1,n−1, y˜t,n − y˜t,1)
V ar(y˜t,2 − y˜t,1) 6= 0⇒ β 6= 1
B.4 Derivation of the results under the AR(1)-Assumption for µˆt+i
If µˆt is an AR(1) process, i.e. µˆt+1 = ρµˆt + εt+1, then we have
Etµˆt+1 = ρµˆt Etµˆt+m = ρmµˆt and Etµˆt+n = ρnµˆt
µˆt+n =ρ
nµˆt +
n∑
i=1
ρi−1εt+n+1−i
µˆ2t+n =ρ
2nµˆ2t +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ρi+j−2εt+n+1−iεt+n+1−j + 2ρnµˆt
n∑
i=1
ρi−1εt+n+1−i
nyt,n
=− log Etexp
[
n(log δ − log µ¯)− φµˆt+n −
n∑
i=1
µˆt+i +
1
2
ηµˆ
2
t+n + φµˆt −
1
2
ηµˆ
2
t
]
=n(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt +
1
2
ηµˆ
2
t − log Etexp
(
−
n∑
i=1
µˆt+i − φµˆt+n +
1
2
ηµˆ
2
t+n
)
=n(log µ¯− log δ) +
(
n∑
i=1
ρ
i
+ φρ
n − φ
)
µˆt +
1
2
η
(
1− ρ2n
)
µˆ
2
t−
log Etexp
 1
2
η
 n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ρ
i+j−2
εt+n+1−iεt+n+1−j + 2ρnµˆt
n∑
i=1
ρ
i−1
εt+n+1−i
− n∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
ρ
j−1
εt+i+1−j − φ
n∑
i=1
ρ
i−1
εt+n+1−i

When we rewrite the equation as a matrix form, we get
nyt,n
=n(log µ¯− log δ) +
(
n∑
i=1
ρi + φρn − φ
)
µˆt +
1
2
η
(
1− ρ2n) µˆ2t
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− logEtexp
(
TATA+ TD +DT 
)
=n(log µ¯− log δ) +
(
n∑
i=1
ρi + φρn − φ
)
µˆt +
1
2
η
(
1− ρ2n) µˆ2t − 2DTΩTD
+
1
2
log
∣∣In − 2ΣATA∣∣ (B.21)
where
 =

εt+1
...
εt+n
 ∼ N(0,Σ), and Σ = σ2In, ATA = 12η

ρ2(n−1) · · · ρ(n−1)
...
. . .
...
ρ(n−1) · · · 1

and
D =
1
2

(ηρnµˆt − φ)ρn−1 −
∑n
i=1 ρ
i−1
(ηρnµˆt − φ)ρn−2 −
∑n−1
i=1 ρ
i−1
...
(ηρnµˆt − φ)ρ− (1 + ρ)
(ηρnµˆt − φ)− 1

1
2
Σ−1 −ATA = 1
2
Ω−1 i.e. Ω =
(
Σ−1 − 2ATA)−1 and D = 1
2
Ω−1ν, i.e. ν = 2ΩD
(B.22)
(n−m)yt+m,n−m =(n−m)(log µ¯− log δ) +
(
n−m∑
i=1
ρi + φρn−m − φ
)
µˆt+m
+
1
2
η
(
1− ρ2n) µˆ2t+m − 2DˆT ΩˆT Dˆ + 12 log ∣∣∣In−m − 2ΣˆAˆT Aˆ∣∣∣ (B.23)
Clearly, it is impossible to get a general analytical solution for any number of n andm. For
simplification, we try the easiest number, i.e. n = 2 and m = 1. Substituting n = 2 and
m = 1 into (B.21) and (B.23) we get:
2yt,2
=− log Etexp
[
2(log δ − log µ¯)− φµˆt+2 − µˆt+1 − µˆt+2 +
1
2
ηµˆ
2
t+2 + φµˆt −
1
2
ηµˆ
2
t
]
=2(log µ¯− log δ)− φµˆt +
1
2
ηµˆ
2
t − log Etexp
(
−µˆt+1 − µˆt+2 − φµˆt+2 +
1
2
ηµˆ
2
t+2
)
=2(log µ¯− log δ) +
(
ρ + ρ
2
+ φρ
2 − φ
)
µˆt +
1
2
η
(
1− ρ4
)
µˆ
2
t−
log Etexp
 1
2
η
 2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
ρ
i+j−2
εt+3−iεt+3−j + 2ρ2µˆt
2∑
i=1
ρ
i−1
εt+3−i
− 2∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
ρ
j−1
εt+i+1−j − φ
2∑
i=1
ρ
i−1
εt+3−i
 (B.24)
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12
η
 2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
ρi+j−2εt+3−iεt+3−j + 2ρ2µˆt
2∑
i=1
ρi−1εt+3−i
− 2∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
ρj−1εt+i+1−j
− φ
2∑
i=1
ρi−1εt+3−i
=
1
2
η
(
ε2t+2 + ρ
2ε2t+1 + 2ρεt+2εt+1 + 2ρ
3µˆtεt+1 + 2ρ
2µˆtεt+2
)− εt+1 − εt+2 − ρεt+1
− φεt+2 − φρεt+1
=
1
2
η
(
ε2t+2 + ρ
2ε2t+1 + 2ρεt+2εt+1
)
+
(
ηρ3µˆt − φρ− ρ− 1
)
εt+1 +
(
ηρ2µˆt − φ− 1
)
εt+2
When we rewrite (B.24) as a matrix form, we get
2yt,2
=2(log µ¯− log δ) + (ρ2 + φρ2 + ρ− φ) µˆt + 1
2
η
(
1− ρ4) µˆ2t
− logEt+mexp
(
˜T A˜T A˜˜+ ˜T D˜ + D˜T ˜
)
=2(log µ¯− log δ) + (ρ2 + φρ2 + ρ− φ) µˆt + 1
2
η
(
1− ρ4) µˆ2t
− log
 1|Σ˜| 12 1∣∣∣Σ˜−1 − 2A˜T A˜∣∣∣ 12 exp
(
D˜T Ω˜T D˜
)
=2(log µ¯− log δ) + (ρ2 + φρ2 + ρ− φ) µˆt + 1
2
η
(
1− ρ4) µˆ2t − 2D˜T Ω˜T D˜
+
1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2ρ2) (B.25)
where
˜ =
 εt+1
εt+2
 ∼ N(0, Σ˜), and Σ˜ = σ2I2, A˜T A˜ = 1
2
η
 ρ2 ρ
ρ 1

and
D˜ =
1
2
 ηρ3µˆt − φρ− ρ− 1
ηρ2µˆt − φ− 1

1
2
Σ˜−1 − A˜T A˜ = 1
2
Ω˜−1 i.e. Ω˜ =
(
Σ˜−1 − 2A˜T A˜
)−1
and D˜ =
1
2
Ω˜−1ν˜, i.e. ν˜ = 2Ω˜D˜
yt,1 =− logEtexp
[
log δ − log µ¯− φµˆt+1 − µˆt+1 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+1 + φµˆt −
1
2
ηµˆ2t
]
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= log µ¯− log δ − φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t − logEtexp
[
−(φ+ 1)µˆt+1 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+1
]
= log µ¯− log δ + (ρφ+ ρ− φ)µˆt + 1
2
η(1− ρ2)µˆ2t
− logEtexp
[
(ηρµˆt − φ− 1)εt+1 + 1
2
ηε2t+1
]
= log µ¯− log δ + (ρφ+ ρ− φ)µˆt + 1
2
η(1− ρ2)µˆ2t −
(ηρµˆt − φ− 1)2σ2
2(1− ησ2) +
1
2
log(1− ησ2)
(B.26)
yt+1,1
=− logEt+1exp
[
log δ − log µ¯− φµˆt+2 − µˆt+2 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+2 + φµˆt+1 −
1
2
ηµˆ2t+1
]
= log µ¯− log δ − φµˆt+1 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+1 − logEt+1exp
[
−(φ+ 1)µˆt+2 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+2
]
= log µ¯− log δ + (ρφ+ ρ− φ)µˆt+1 + 1
2
η(1− ρ2)µˆ2t+1
− logEt+1exp
[
(ηρµˆt+1 − φ− 1)εt+2 + 1
2
ηε2t+2
]
= log µ¯− log δ + (ρφ+ ρ− φ)µˆt+1 + 1
2
η(1− ρ2)µˆ2t+1 −
(ηρµˆt+1 − φ− 1)2σ2
2(1− ησ2)
+
1
2
log(1− ησ2) (B.27)
Et(yt+1,1) = log µ¯− log δ + (ρ2 + ρ2φ− ρφ)µˆt + 1
2
η(ρ2 − ρ4)µˆ2t +
1
2
η(1− ρ2)σ2
− (ηρ
2µˆt − φ− 1)2σ2 + η2ρ2σ4
2(1− ησ2) +
1
2
log(1− ησ2) (B.28)
yt,1 − 2yt,2 =2D˜T Ω˜T D˜ − (log µ¯− log δ)− (ρ2 + ρ2φ− ρφ)µˆt − 1
2
η(ρ2 − ρ4)µˆ2t
− 1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2ρ2)− (ηρµˆt − φ− 1)2σ2
2(1− ησ2) +
1
2
log(1− ησ2) (B.29)
Etrxt+1,2
=Et(yt+1,1) + yt,1 − 2yt,2
=− (ηρµˆt − φ− 1)
2σ2 + (ηρ2µˆt − φ− 1)2σ2 + η2ρ2σ4
2(1− ησ2) + log(1− ησ
2) +
1
2
η(1− ρ2)σ2
+ 2D˜TΩT D˜ − 1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − σ2ρ2)
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=− η
2ρ2σ2(1 + ρ2)
2(1− ησ2) µˆ
2
t +
2ηρσ2(φ+ 1)(ρ+ 1)
2(1− ησ2) µˆt + 2D˜
TΩT D˜ + a constant term (B.30)
where
D˜T Ω˜T D˜
=
[
(ησ4 − σ2)(ρ+ φρ− ηρ3µˆt + 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1) −
ηρσ4(−ηρ2µˆt + φ+ 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
]
(ρ+ φρ− ηρ3µˆt + 1)
−
[
(σ2 − ηρ2σ4)(−ηρ2µˆt + φ+ 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1) +
ηρσ4(ρ+ φρ− ηρ3µˆt + 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
] (−ηρ2µˆt + φ+ 1)
=
(ησ4 − σ2)(ρ+ φρ− ηρ3µˆt + 1)2 − ηρσ4(−ηρ2µˆt + φ+ 1)(ρ+ φρ− ηρ3µˆt + 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
− (σ
2 − ηρ2σ4)(−ηρ2µˆt + φ+ 1)2 + ηρσ4(−ηρ2µˆt + φ+ 1)(ρ+ φρ− ηρ3µˆt + 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
=
(ησ4 − σ2)(ρ+ φρ− ηρ3µˆt + 1)2 − 2ηρσ4(−ηρ2µˆt + φ+ 1)(ρ+ φρ− ηρ3µˆt + 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
− (σ
2 − ηρ2σ4)(−ηρ2µˆt + φ+ 1)2
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
=
−η2ρ4σ2(ρ2 + 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1) µˆ
2
t +
ηρ2σ2(φ+ 1)(ρ2 + 1)− η2ρ4σ4 + ηρ3σ2
2(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1) µˆt
+ a constant term (B.31)
yt,2 − yt,1 =
[
η
2
(
ρ2 − ρ
4
2
− 1
2
)
+
η2ρ2σ2
2(1− ησ2)
]
µˆ2t+[
1
2
(φρ2 + ρ2 − 2φρ+ φ− ρ)− ηρ(φ+ 1)σ
2
1− ησ2
]
µˆt − D˜T Ω˜T D˜ + a constant term
(B.32)
where
D˜T Ω˜T D˜ =
−η2ρ4σ2(ρ2 + 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1) µˆ
2
t +
ηρ2σ2(φ+ 1)(ρ2 + 1)− η2ρ4σ4 + ηρ3σ2
2(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1) µˆt
+ a constant term (B.33)
We drop the constant parts for each equation and get
Etr̂xt+1,2 =αµˆ2t + ψµˆt (B.34)
yˆt,2 − yˆt,1 =ξµˆ2t + κµˆt (B.35)
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where
α =−
[
η2ρ2σ2(1 + ρ2)
2(1− ησ2) +
η2ρ4σ2(ρ2 + 1)
2(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
]
ψ =
2ηρσ2(φρ+ ρ+ φ+ 1)
2(1− ησ2) +
ηρ2σ2(φ+ 1)(ρ2 + 1)− η2ρ4σ4 + ηρ3σ2
ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1
ξ =
η
2
(
ρ2 − ρ
4
2
− 1
2
)
+
η2ρ2σ2
2(1− ησ2) +
η2ρ4σ2(ρ2 + 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
κ =
1
2
[
(φρ2 + ρ2 − 2φρ+ φ− ρ)− 2ηρ(φ+ 1)σ
2
1− ησ2
]
−
1
2
[
ηρ2σ2(φ+ 1)(ρ2 + 1)− η2ρ4σ4 + ηρ3σ2
ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1
]
Cov(Etr̂xt+1,1, yt,2 − yt,1) =E[(αµˆ2t + ψµˆt)(ξµˆ2t + κµˆt)]− E(αµˆ2t + ψµˆt)E(ξµˆ2t + κµˆt)
=
2αξσ4
(1− ρ2)2 +
ψκσ2
1− ρ2 (B.36)
V ar(yˆt,2 − yˆt,1) = V ar(ξµˆ2t + κµˆt) =
2ξ2σ4
(1− ρ2)2 +
κ2σ2
1− ρ2 (B.37)
β2,1 = 1 +
Cov(Etrxt+1,1, yt,2 − yt,1)
V ar(yt,2 − yt,1) =1 +
Cov(Etr̂xt+1,1, yˆt,2 − yˆt,1)
V ar(yˆt,2 − yˆt,1)
=1 +
2αξσ4 + ψκσ2(1− ρ2)
2ξ2σ4 + κ2σ2(1− ρ2)
B.5 Derivation of the real yield curves under the AR(1)-Assumption for µˆt+i
We use “*” to indicate anything which is specific to the real term.
ny∗t,n
=− logEtexp
[
n log δ − φµˆt+n + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+n + φµˆt −
1
2
ηµˆ2t
]
(B.38)
=− n log δ − φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t − logEtexp
(
1
2
ηµˆ2t+n − φµˆt+n
)
=− n log δ + φ (ρn − 1) µˆt + 1
2
η
(
1− ρ2n) µˆ2t−
logEtexp
1
2
η
 n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ρi+j−2εt+n+1−iεt+n+1−j + 2ρnµˆt
n∑
i=1
ρi−1εt+n+1−i
− φ n∑
i=1
ρi−1εt+n+1−i

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Rewriting the equation as a matrix form, we get
ny∗t,n =− n log δ + φ (ρn − 1) µˆt +
1
2
η
(
1− ρ2n) µˆ2t − logEtexp (TATA+ TD∗ +D∗T )
=− n log δ + φ (ρn − 1) µˆt + 1
2
η
(
1− ρ2n) µˆ2t − 2D∗TΩTD∗ + 12 log ∣∣In − 2ΣATA∣∣
(B.39)
where
 =

εt+1
...
εt+n
 ∼ N(0,Σ), and Σ = σ2In, ATA = 12η

ρ2(n−1) · · · ρ(n−1)
...
. . .
...
ρ(n−1) · · · 1

and
D∗ =
1
2

(ηρnµˆt − φ)ρn−1
(ηρnµˆt − φ)ρn−2
...
(ηρnµˆt − φ)ρ
(ηρnµˆt − φ)

1
2
Σ−1 −ATA = 1
2
Ω−1 i.e. Ω =
(
Σ−1 − 2ATA)−1 and D∗ = 1
2
Ω−1ν, i.e. ν = 2ΩD∗
(B.40)
Substituting n = 2 and m = 1 into (B.40) we get
2y∗t,2
=− logEtexp
[
2 log δ − φµˆt+2 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+2 + φµˆt −
1
2
ηµˆ2t
]
=− 2 log δ − φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t − logEtexp
(
1
2
ηµˆ2t+2 − φµˆt+2
)
=− 2 log δ + (φρ2 − φ) µˆt + 1
2
η
(
1− ρ4) µˆ2t−
logEtexp
1
2
η
 2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
ρi+j−2εt+3−iεt+3−j + 2ρ2µˆt
2∑
i=1
ρi−1εt+3−i
− φ 2∑
i=1
ρi−1εt+3−i

(B.41)
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When we rewrite (B.41) as a matrix form, we get
2y∗t,2
=− 2 log δ + φ (ρ2 − 1) µˆt + 1
2
η
(
1− ρ4) µˆ2t − logEt+mexp(˜T A˜T A˜˜+ ˜T D˜∗ + D˜∗T ˜)
=− 2 log δ + φ (ρ2 − 1) µˆt + 1
2
η
(
1− ρ4) µˆ2t − log
 1|Σ˜| 12 1∣∣∣Σ˜−1 − 2A˜T A˜∣∣∣ 12 exp
(
D˜∗
T
Ω˜T D˜∗
)
=− 2 log δ + φ (ρ2 − 1) µˆt + 1
2
η
(
1− ρ4) µˆ2t − 2D˜∗T Ω˜T D˜∗ + 12 log (1− ησ2 − ησ2ρ2)
(B.42)
y∗t,1 =− logEtexp
[
log δ − φµˆt+1 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+1 + φµˆt −
1
2
ηµˆ2t
]
=− log δ − φµˆt + 1
2
ηµˆ2t − logEtexp
[
1
2
ηµˆ2t+1 − φµˆt+1
]
=− log δ + φ(ρ− 1)µˆt + 1
2
η(1− ρ2)µˆ2t − logEtexp
[
(ηρµˆt − φ)εt+1 + 1
2
ηε2t+1
]
=− log δ + φ(ρ− 1)µˆt + 1
2
η(1− ρ2)µˆ2t −
(ηρµˆt − φ)2σ2
2(1− ησ2) +
1
2
log(1− ησ2) (B.43)
y∗t+1,1
=− logEt+1exp
[
log δ − φµˆt+2 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+2 + φµˆt+1 −
1
2
ηµˆ2t+1
]
=− log δ − φµˆt+1 + 1
2
ηµˆ2t+1 − logEt+1exp
[
1
2
ηµˆ2t+2 − φµˆt+2
]
=− log δ + φ(ρ− 1)µˆt+1 + 1
2
η(1− ρ2)µˆ2t+1 − logEt+1exp
[
(ηρµˆt+1 − φ)εt+2 + 1
2
ηε2t+2
]
=− log δ + φ(ρ− 1)µˆt+1 + 1
2
η(1− ρ2)µˆ2t+1 −
(ηρµˆt+1 − φ)2σ2
2(1− ησ2) +
1
2
log(1− ησ2) (B.44)
y∗t,1 − 2y∗t,2 =2D˜∗
T
Ω˜T D˜∗ + log δ + φρ(1− ρ)µˆt − 1
2
η(ρ2 − ρ4)µˆ2t −
(ηρµˆt − φ)2σ2
2(1− ησ2)
− 1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − ησ2ρ2)+ 1
2
log(1− ησ2) (B.45)
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Etrx∗t+1,2
=Et(y∗t+1,1) + y∗t,1 − 2y∗t,2
=− (ηρµˆt − φ)
2σ2 + (ηρ2µˆt − φ)2σ2 + η2ρ2σ4
2(1− ησ2) + log(1− ησ
2) +
1
2
η(1− ρ2)σ2
+ 2D˜∗
T
ΩT D˜∗ − 1
2
log
(
1− ησ2 − σ2ρ2)
=− η
2ρ2σ2(1 + ρ2)
2(1− ησ2) µˆ
2
t +
2ηρσ2φ(ρ+ 1)
2(1− ησ2) µˆt + 2D˜
∗TΩT D˜∗ + a constant term (B.46)
y∗t,2 − y∗t,1 =
[
η
2
(
ρ2 − ρ
4
2
− 1
2
)
+
η2ρ2σ2
2(1− ησ2)
]
µˆ2t+[
1
2
(φρ2 − 2φρ+ φ)− ηρφσ
2
1− ησ2
]
µˆt − D˜∗T Ω˜T D˜∗ + a constant term (B.47)
where
D˜∗
T
Ω˜T D˜∗ =
φρ− ηρ3µˆt
2
[
(φρ− ηρ3µˆt)(ησ2 − 1)σ2
2(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1) −
ηρσ4(φ− ηρ2µˆt)
2(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
]
− φ− ηρ
2µˆt
2
[
(φ− ηρ2µˆt)(σ2 − ηρ2σ4)
2(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1) +
ηρσ4(φρ− ηρ3µˆt)
2(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
]
=− η
2ρ4σ2(ρ2 + 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1) µˆ
2
t +
ηρ2σ2φ(ρ2 + 1)
2(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1) µˆt + a constant term (B.48)
Dropping the constant parts for each equation,
Etr̂x∗t+1,2 =αµˆ2t + ψ∗µˆt (B.49)
yˆ∗t,2 − yˆ∗t,1 =ξµˆ2t + κ∗µˆt (B.50)
where
α =−
[
η2ρ2σ2(1 + ρ2)
2(1− ησ2) +
η2ρ4σ2(ρ2 + 1)
2(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
]
ψ∗ =
2ηρσ2φ(ρ+ 1)
2(1− ησ2) +
ηρ2σ2φ(ρ2 + 1)
ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1
ξ =
η
2
(
ρ2 − ρ
4
2
− 1
2
)
+
η2ρ2σ2
2(1− ησ2) +
η2ρ4σ2(ρ2 + 1)
4(ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1)
κ∗ =
1
2
[
(φρ2 − 2φρ+ φ)− 2ηρφσ
2
1− ησ2
]
− 1
2
[
ηρ2σ2φ(ρ2 + 1)
ηρ2σ2 + ησ2 − 1
]
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Cov(Etr̂x∗t+1,1, y∗t,2 − y∗t,1) =E[(αµˆ2t + ψ∗µˆt)(ξµˆ2t + κ∗µˆt)]− E(αµˆ2t + ψ∗µˆt)E(ξµˆ2t + κ∗µˆt)
=
2αξσ4
(1− ρ2)2 +
ψ∗κ∗σ2
1− ρ2 (B.51)
V ar(yˆt,2 − yˆt,1) = V ar(ξµˆ2t + κ∗µˆt) =
2ξ2σ4
(1− ρ2)2 +
κ∗2σ2
1− ρ2 (B.52)
β∗2,1 = 1 +
Cov(Etrx∗t+1,1, y∗t,2 − y∗t,1)
V ar(y∗t,2 − y∗t,1)
=1 +
Cov(Etr̂x∗t+1,1, yˆ∗t,2 − yˆ∗t,1)
V ar(yˆt,2 − yˆt,1)
=1 +
2αξσ4 + ψ∗κ∗σ2(1− ρ2)
2ξ2σ4 + κ∗2σ2(1− ρ2)
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Table 2: Theoretical Values of βn,1 under MA(1)-Money Growth
σ βn,1
θ
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.0033
β2,1 1.003 1.007 1.011 1.008 0.999 0.992 0.990 0.989 0.989
β4,1 1.002 1.004 1.006 1.008 1.007 1.004 1.001 0.998 0.996
β6,1 1.002 1.003 1.005 1.007 1.007 1.005 1.002 1.000 0.998
β9,1 1.001 1.003 1.005 1.006 1.006 1.005 1.003 1.001 0.999
0.0115
β2,1 1.033 1.078 1.110 1.048 0.930 0.869 0.850 0.847 0.849
β4,1 1.021 1.046 1.073 1.087 1.069 1.024 0.977 0.944 0.924
β6,1 1.019 1.041 1.064 1.079 1.074 1.045 1.006 0.973 0.950
β9,1 1.017 1.038 1.059 1.075 1.073 1.052 1.019 0.988 0.965
Table 3: Theoretical Values of β2,1 under AR(1)-Money Growth
Panel A: Regression slope coefficients for nominal yields, β2,1
σ φ
ρ
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.0033
10 1.003 1.007 1.013 1.022 1.035 1.054 1.080 1.115 1.156
20 1.003 1.007 1.014 1.024 1.040 1.067 1.114 1.203 1.307
30 1.003 1.007 1.014 1.024 1.041 1.069 1.122 1.238 1.515
0.0115
10 1.023 1.051 1.086 1.133 1.202 1.311 1.512 1.838 -1.810
20 1.033 1.081 1.148 1.239 1.352 1.456 1.399 0.681 -0.313
30 1.037 1.093 1.179 1.312 1.501 1.674 1.267 -0.146 -0.029
0.0180
10 1.044 1.098 1.170 1.273 1.416 1.472 0.104 -3.283 -1.357
20 1.085 1.195 1.314 1.365 1.118 0.335 -0.448 -3.369 -1.308
30 1.106 1.269 1.480 1.524 0.720 -0.369 -0.602 -3.348 -1.278
Panel B: Regression slope coefficients for real yields, β∗2,1
σ φ
ρ
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.0033
10 1.003 1.006 1.012 1.020 1.031 1.049 1.079 1.128 1.264
20 1.003 1.007 1.013 1.022 1.037 1.061 1.104 1.188 1.409
30 1.003 1.007 1.013 1.023 1.038 1.065 1.113 1.215 1.529
0.0115
10 1.021 1.047 1.082 1.132 1.208 1.340 1.607 2.207 -3.018
20 1.032 1.077 1.141 1.230 1.351 1.497 1.576 0.889 -1.239
30 1.035 1.089 1.172 1.300 1.489 1.711 1.524 -0.134 -0.711
0.0180
10 1.041 1.095 1.173 1.297 1.503 1.747 0.026 -2.915 -1.358
20 1.081 1.188 1.314 1.407 1.264 0.470 -0.621 -2.755 -1.305
30 1.103 1.260 1.472 1.578 0.899 -0.355 -0.735 -2.489 -1.272
Table 4: Average Values of Simulated β under i.i.d-Money Growth
n = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
β¯n,1 = 1.009 1.006 1.006 1.005 1.005 1.005 1.005 1.005 1.005
β¯n,2 = – 0.996 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.998
where η = 1000, φ = 20, σ = 0.0115, µ¯ = 1.05, δ = 0.95.
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Table 5: Average Values of Simulated β under MA(1)-Money Growth
n = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
β¯n,1 = 0.857 0.897 0.924 0.939 0.949 0.955 0.960 0.963 0.966
β¯n,2 = – 1.037 1.018 1.015 1.014 1.013 1.012 1.012 1.012
where η = 1000, φ = 20, σ = 0.0115, µ¯ = 1.05, δ = 0.95, θ = 0.9.
Table 6: Average Values of Simulated βn,m under AR(1)-Money Growth
Panel A: Regression slope coefficients for nominal yields, β¯n,m
σ ρ m
n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.0080
0.6
1 1.458 1.375 1.326 1.294 1.272 1.256 1.244 1.235 1.228
2 – 1.301 1.240 1.204 1.181 1.165 1.154 1.146 1.140
0.9
1 1.088 1.102 1.123 1.148 1.175 1.204 1.234 1.263 1.292
2 – 1.164 1.174 1.188 1.206 1.226 1.248 1.270 1.293
0.0115
0.6
1 1.565 1.487 1.439 1.407 1.385 1.369 1.357 1.348 1.340
2 – 1.444 1.369 1.322 1.291 1.270 1.255 1.243 1.234
0.9
1 0.214 0.160 0.065 -0.036 -0.129 -0.207 -0.266 -0.308 -0.335
2 – 0.471 0.327 0.191 0.067 -0.032 -0.115 -0.178 -0.224
Panel B: Regression slope coefficients for real yields, β¯∗n,m
σ ρ m
n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.0080
0.6
1 1.440 1.345 1.326 1.292 1.259 1.238 1.223 1.212 1.204
2 – 1.261 1.203 1.171 1.151 1.138 1.129 1.122 1.117
0.9
1 1.550 1.690 1.800 1.884 1.948 1.995 2.029 2.053 2.070
2 – 1.817 1.896 1.953 1.993 2.020 2.036 2.046 2.051
0.0115
0.6
1 1.621 1.531 1.473 1.435 1.409 1.389 1.375 1.363 1.354
2 – 1.449 1.367 1.316 1.283 1.261 1.246 1.234 1.225
0.9
1 -1.073 -1.095 -1.116 -1.132 -1.140 -1.138 -1.126 -1.103 -1.072
2 – -0.733 -0.787 -0.834 -0.872 -0.898 -0.912 -0.913 -0.903
where η = 1000, φ = 20, µ¯ = 1.05, δ = 0.95.
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Table 7: Values of Simulated β under AR(4)-Money Growth
Panel A: Regression slope coefficients for nominal yields, β¯n,m
n = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
βn,1 = -0.492 -0.589 -0.188 -0.009 -0.458 -0.584 -0.419 -0.382 -0.415
βn,2 = – -0.368 -0.434 -0.277 -0.324 -0.445 -0.481 -0.495 -0.339
Panel B: Regression slope coefficients for real yields, β¯∗n,m
n = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
βn,1 = -0.960 -0.667 -0.208 0.103 -0.174 -0.140 -0.010 -0.003 0.072
βn,2 = – -1.381 -0.960 -0.182 -0.064 -0.336 -0.206 -0.019 -0.004
Parameter value: η = 1000, φ = 10, σ = 0.008, µ¯ = 1.05, δ = 0.95, ρ1 = 0.3 , ρ2 = 0.2,
ρ3 = 0.2, ρ4 = 0.2.
Table 8: Values of Simulated β under AR(12)-Money Growth
Panel A: Regression slope coefficients for nominal yields, β¯n,m
n = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
βn,1 = -0.853 -0.525 -0.091 0.043 -0.085 0.005 0.079 -0.110 -0.699
βn,2 = – -1.287 -0.779 -0.168 -0.120 -0.182 -0.090 -0.613 -0.181
Panel B: Regression slope coefficients for real yields, β¯∗n,m
n = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
βn,1 = -0.854 -0.499 -0.156 -0.030 -0.150 -0.100 -0.054 -0.038 0.004
βn,2 = – -1.362 -0.793 -0.243 -0.203 -0.294 -0.178 -0.122 -0.051
Parameter value: η = 1000, φ = 10, σ = 0.008, µ¯ = 1.05, δ = 0.95, ρ1 = 0.1, ρ2 = 0.08,
ρ3 = 0.08, ρ4 = 0.05, ρ5 = 0.05 , ρ6 = 0.05, ρ7 = 0.05, ρ8 = 0.05, ρ9 = 0.05 , ρ10 = 0.05,
ρ11 = 0.05, ρ12 = 0.05,
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Table 9: Values of Inflation Parameter
Country σˆ ρˆ Prob. of ρˆ = 0
Bel 0.0027 0.072 0.440
Can 0.0019 0.188 0.072
Fin 0.0029 0.133 0.153
Fr 0.0021 0.127 0.171
Ger 0.0031 0.141 0.130
It 0.0021 0.452 0.000
Jap 0.0042 0.209 0.024
Neth 0.0037 0.180 0.054
Nor 0.0030 0.027 0.769
Port 0.0048 0.406 0.000
Spa 0.0032 0.101 0.276
Swe 0.0058 0.256 0.005
Swit 0.0024 0.432 0.000
UK 0.0051 0.160 0.085
US 0.0018 0.264 0.004
Table 10: Results of Regression for Eq. (6.1)
(n,m) bn,m dn,m prob. of bn,m=0 prob. of dn,m=0 prob. of F-stat. R2
(2, 1) -1.615 -122.269 0.112 0.161 0.143 0.322
(3, 1) -2.743 -235.523 0.035 0.037 0.028 0.512
(4, 1) -1.524 -583.460 0.762 0.211 0.428 0.191
(6, 1) -0.562 -253.776 0.894 0.499 0.777 0.061
(9, 1) -2.467 -531.937 0.657 0.292 0.553 0.137
(12, 1) -0.628 -675.853 0.924 0.319 0.562 0.134
(6, 3) -1.675 70.987 0.469 0.722 0.686 0.073
(9, 3) -2.062 -19.992 0.445 0.931 0.736 0.059
(12, 3) -0.620 19.928 0.853 0.945 0.978 0.005
(9, 6) -3.641 -69.560 0.132 0.726 0.301 0.213
(12, 6) -3.487 -22.527 0.282 0.934 0.543 0.115
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Figure 1: Comovement between β2,1 and σ and ρ
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Figure 2: Comovement between β∗2,1 and σ and ρ
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Figure 3: β10,1 under i.i.d-inflation (β¯10,1 = 1.005± 0.077)
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Figure 4: β10,2 under i.i.d-inflation (β¯10,2 = 0.998± 0.093)
 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
1.2 
1.4 
0 50 100 150 200 
V
a
lu
e
 o
f 
β
 
Simulation 
Figure 5: β10,1 under MA(1)-inflation (β¯10,1 = 0.966± 0.102)
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Figure 6: β10,2 under MA(1)-inflation (β¯10,2 = 1.012± 0.103)
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Figure 7: β10,1 under AR(1)-inflation (β¯10,1 = −0.335± 0.550)
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Figure 8: β10,2 under AR(1)-inflation (β¯10,2 = −0.224± 0.555)
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Figure 9: β∗10,1 under AR(1)-inflation (β¯∗10,1 = −1.072± 0.598)
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Figure 10: β∗10,2 under AR(1)-inflation (β¯∗10,2 = −0.903± 0.578)
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Figure 12: Average Simulated Nominal Yields
L,L: σ = 0.008, ρ = 0.6; L,H: σ = 0.008, ρ = 0.9; H,L: σ = 0.0115, ρ = 0.6;
L,H: σ = 0.0115, ρ = 0.9; iid: i.i.d-inflation with σ = 0.0115
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Figure 13: Average Simulated Real Yields
L,L: σ = 0.008, ρ = 0.6; L,H: σ = 0.008, ρ = 0.9; H,L: σ = 0.0115, ρ = 0.6;
L,H: σ = 0.0115, ρ = 0.9; iid: i.i.d-inflation with σ = 0.0115
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